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A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE 
AND 
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 1 
DAVID PERKINS 
PART I 
A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE 
The existence of caricatures has proved something of a 
nuisance to philosophers and psychologists bent on analyzing 
pictorial representation {Gibson 1971 ). The contrast between 
caricature and customary "realistic" representation poses 
part of the problem. A portrait caricature clearly represents a 
certain layout of spatial form, a face-like layout with nose so 
long, mouth so wide, and so forth. This spatial layout 
typically diverges substantially and in calculated ways from 
the true form of the subject's head. What sort of picture is 
this? It is deliberately inaccurate, yet the subject is often 
quite recognizable- perhaps more recognizable than in an 
accurate portrait or photograph. It lies about its subject's 
shape, but in doing so often comments delightfully on that 
shape. If conventional picturing is to be analyzed in terms of 
the picture conveying information to the viewer about its 
subject, then caricature is not strictly part of, but builds on, 
~hat _co~vention, bending it to special purposes. What exactly 
1s gomg on? 
Another part of the puzzle is the variety of pictures 
sometimes called caricatures, but which deviate in obvious 
respects from the most typical usage of the term. Political 
cartoons in general need not represent any known political 
figure. Grote~ Da Vinci's famous set 
{Gombrich 1961 :95) need depict no actual individual or class 
of individuals. A child's cartoon monster labelled "teacher" 
may offer a funny face without satirizing that teacher's 
specific physiognomy. Mergings of human and animal fea-
tures as in Figure 1 by Levine (1969) are a bonus: caricature 
allows but does not demand such a mix. 
The natural attack on these problems is a quest for 
definition, a framing of conditions for caricature which 
would on the one hand specify its relation to realistic 
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portraiture, and on the other admit or exclude, and in any 
case elaborate the relation of caricature to, the various sorts 
of pictures which sometimes are so named. 
Two concepts merit special attention in the search for 
definition. One is exaggeration: a caricature typically ex-
aggerates features of its subject. The second is individuation: 
a caricature typically exaggerates so as to differentiate the 
subject from his fellows. Exaggeration and individuation 
alone promise some unscrambling of the problems sketched 
above. Exaggeration seems a meaningful concept only in a 
symbol system where one can also tell the truth. This might 
illuminate caricature's dependence on and relation to a 
tradition of realistic portraiture. Individuation commands 
that the caricature remain true to the subject's physiognomy 
at some level, reflecting the intuition that mere distortion, as 
in the child's cartoon monster, is not caricature. 
Such factors prompt a preliminary and very traditional 
definition: a caricature is a symbol that exaggerates in-
dividuating characteristics of its subject. Indeed, a refinement 
of this will provide the final formulation. But along the way 
some major difficulties demand attention. First, prior writers 
have proposed other conditions in addition to exaggeration 
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Figure 2 - Nazi caricatures of jews 
and individuation; for instance, a caricature must be 
humorous. On what grounds are these additional constraints 
dismissed? Second, individuation and exaggeration are them-
selves concepts hardly clearer than caricature. The definition 
becomes little more than a game of word substitution unless 
these terms themselves can be explicated, particularly as they 
relate to realistic representation. Third, it is not enough that 
a definition simply stake out roughly the class of pictures 
usually called caricatures. Many definitions could do about 
equally well statistically, including the above, the above with 
"humor" also required, or "grotesque drawings which repre-
sent real subjects." The discussion will argue that the above 
definition and its elaboration, far from being arbitrary, 
illuminate the essential psychology of perceiving caricatures. 
FURTHER CONDITIONS? 
Prior definitions of caricature are mainly introductions, 
asides and ornaments to a body of work with quite a 
different focus. Most of the surprisingly extensive literature 
on caricaturing deals with the evolution of the form, 
biographies of caricaturists, and presentation of examples 
without technical discussion. The range of art treated is 
generally wider than portrait caricature, encompassing also 
the political cartoon or grotesque figures. "Caricature" is 
sometimes used synonymously with either of these. The 
details of the relation between drawing and subject are 
persistently neglected. Rarely does one even find a portrait 
and a caricature of an individual side-by-side. For some 
happy exceptions, see Berger (1952), Gombrich (1963), 
Rother ( 1966). 
Definitions, when attempted at all, have their favorite 
vocabulary. Besides "individuation" and "exaggeration," key 
words are "humor," "idealization," "defects," and "person-
ality" as well as near synonyms of these. Whether such terms 
can add to the conception of caricature sketched above 
demands appraisal. The concl11sian will be that they cannot. 
Humor. 
Hum9r stands · J+-i.o.!imate relationship to caricature, 
often figuring in the definitions put forth by various writers. 
Proposals that caricature is the exaggeration of an individ-
ual's characteristic features to comic effect, or the like, 
appear frequently (American Heritage Dictionary 1969; 
Murray, quoted in Ashbee 1928:1, 25; Berger 1952: 7; Davies 
1928:1). But hum~ubious as a condition for 
caricature. 
First of all, there are dr_awings which clearly deserve the 
label but are of doubtful humor. Figure 2 from Gombrich 
(1963) illustrates caricatures of Jews devised by the Nazi 
propaganda effort, caricatures which are too vicious to be 
funny. Commonly, one finds political cartoons incorporating 
portrait caricatures which in themselves are at best very 
mildly humorous. They primarily serve as reference mechan-
isms for the real joke of the caption or whole cartoon. It 
seems strange to place the humor of the caricatured face so 
much in the center of things by definition when it is often 
rather peripheral to the entire comic effect. Figure 3 points 
up another problem. Some artists such as James House 
(Figure 3), and Oscar Berger (1952) often emphasize likeness 
of personality rather than humor; the product is not 
intended to prompt a laugh. Finally, there are contrast 
enhancement techniques in photography and caricature-style 
drawings of complex machinery (Ryan and Schwartz 1956). 
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Figure 3 - Fritz Kreisler 
These are hardly comic subjects, but the term caricature, if 
humor is not a condition, seems an illuminating name for 
such pictures. 
If one's area of interest is portrait caricatures, the added 
condition of exaggeration "to comic effect" would narrow 
very little the class of drawings satisfying the requirements; 
exaggeration and individuation fix the range of the term 
adequately. And a requirement of humor would connect 
caricature logically with the snarl of philosophical and 
psychological issues surrounding the topic of humor. It seems 
prudent to stay as much on the periphery of that as possible. 
Furthermore, there is a certain tension between the aim of 
humor and the aim of individuation. The political cartoonist 
Paul Szep, of the Boston Globe, has emphasized to me the 
particular difficulty of producing a caricarture in which the 
human face is merged with an animal form. The combination 
can be marvelously appropriate, but the amount of dif-
ferentiating information available is certainly reduced. Worse, 
a long nose for an inquisitive but short-nosed person may be 
in keeping with his behavior, but can injure the likeness. All 
the above considerations sum to the conclusion that humor is 
best considered a contingent property of some caricatures. 
If humor should not be a necessary condition for 
caricature, then what accounts for its undeniable close 
association with the form? A historical answer is in part 
legitimate: caricature has in fact been persistent!~ used t~ 
humorous ends. But such a reply is incomplete if it does not 
confess that caricature lends itself to just such use. The point 
is that exaggeration, a prime tool of the caricaturist, is also a 
key device of the humorist. This does not mean that all 
exaggerated faces are funny, any more than it means that all 
exaggerated faces are identifiable. Exaggeration in various Jr 
cases may serve a humorous end, an individuating purpose, 
both, or neither. That it so often serves both, reflects the 
psychology and the individual culture of the human perceiver 
and the caricaturist's happy exploitation of both psychology 
and culture. "' 
Idealization and Defects 
Idealization seems intuitively the very contrary of carica-
ture. Both depart from faithful portraiture, but somehow in 
opposite directions. Roughly speaking, idealization means 
producing a picture of a subject so as to emphasize various 
canons of beauty, masculinity, or whatever, established in 
the artist's society. As such, idealization is one form of 
exaggeration. This encourages the complementary view that 
ugliness is as central to caricature as idealization is counter to 
it. Caricature is seen as the exaggeration of the defects of a 
physiognomy {Davies 1928; Baldinucci, quoted in Gombrich 
1961 :344; Grose, quoted in Lynch 1927:9; Bergson, quoted 
in Lynch 1927:5; Random House Dictionary 1968). 
But such a formulation reflects a philosophy in which 
any departure from an ideal counts as a defect. The usage of 
these terms is more tolerant today. Individuality itself carries 
certain positive values. There is a large middle ground 
between what counts as ideal and what counts as defective. 
Exaggeration of individuating features may not produce ideal 
types, but need not produce ugliness. Oscar Berger {1952) 
presents a number of benign caricatures of various public 
figures, done in sittings with their cooperation. In sum, 
exaggeration of defects is simply too specialized a require-
ment to be called a necessary condition for caricature; there 
are too many pictures called caricatures that would not be so 
described. 
Furthermore, ugly caricatures are not really needed to 
satisfy our hunch that caricature runs contrary to idealiza-
tion. Another symmetry besides beauty and ugliness serves as 
well. Idealization is a transformation that blurs the distinc-
tiveness of the particular face; a range of individuals all 
idealized are depicted as sharing many features that comprise 
the ideal standard and hence are less differentiated. Thus 
while caricature individuates, idealization disindividuates. 
Personality 
Many caricaturists often emphasize conveying person-
alities through their art {Low 1932). In their work, this aim 
accompanies or replaces humor. Those that take this ap-
proach must gather information about a subject's character; 
the personal interview and/or sitting is a favorite device 
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(O'Connell 1970; Berger 1952). But Paul Szep has explained 
that personal contact is often impossible where major 
political figures are concerned. First of all a physiognomic 
likeness is the goal. Next, the political cartoonist must 
generally work from his target's public character, not his 
"home" character- both because that is what is accessible 
and that is what the public knows. Finally, the aspects of 
character to be emphasized naturally turn on the particular, 
and generally critical, function of the cartoon. Thus the 
extent to which conveying personality is a primary aim varies 
considerably from artist to artist and from circumstance to 
circumstance. Personality is not the focus consistently 
enough for it to serve as a further necessary condition for 
caricature. 
Indeed, expression of personality competes considerably 
with physiognomic individuation. Topffer and numerous 
other artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
systematically explored variations in cartoon and normal 
portraits that yield various personality impressions (Gom-
brich 1961, ch. 1 0). More recently, psychological research 
employing photographs and sometimes composite line faces 
reveals that observers will readily- and often consistently 
across observers- attribute personality traits to strange faces 
(Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973; Hochberg 
1964:105-110; Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955). But 
these personality attributions do not accurately reflect the 
true personalities of the photo's subjects; that is, a subject's 
face will likely suggest a personality not in keeping with his 
actual personality. A caricature or portrait which is both 
recognizable without labels or context and also a faithful 
expression of the subject's true personality (not the super-
ficial personality projected by his face) must be counted as 
an especially fine achievement. 
REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION 
If humor, ugliness and expression of personality are 
inessential to caricature, then exaggeration and individuation 
by themselves must resolve this art form's paradoxes. Two 
symbolic functions of special concern are reference - a 
caricature is of a person - and description - a caricature 
delivers certain shape information about the subject's face. 
In order for the caricature to speak about its subject, the 
subject must be designated. Sometimes audaciously direct 
means are employed: human figures in pictures are simply 
labelled with their names, or relatively unambiguous con-
textual cues are provided- a white house in the background. 
Another major means is to provide a picture recognizable 
from the face as representing a particular individual. Indeed, 
some caricaturists hold it an obligation of their art to eschew 
other techniques, especially when a familiar, plausibly 
recognizable, public figure is the subject. 
Nonabstract pictures, the sorts of concern here, will be 
said to describe. This will simply mean that they provide to 
the viewer information specifying spatial forms and surface 
properties- the shapes, textures, colors of chairs, houses, 
faces, or whatever. This quite deliberately ignores the often 
important distinctions between pictorial and linguistic means 
of symbolizing discussed by Goodman (1968, ch. 4). It 
should be mentioned that in general a description, linguistic 
or pictorial, need not be a description of any actually 
existent thing; whether the description is ascribed to a 
referent is an independent matter. 
That description should be an important function of 
caricature appears implausible, considering that a caricature 
of a person is manifestly and necessarily inaccurate (if it is an 
accurate portrayal we do not normally call it a caricature). 
But the problem disappears once one recognizes that a 
caricature is two descriptions in one. A caricature can be read 
as picturing a face-like spatial form with, for instance, a nose 
three inches long, an absurdly weak chin, and so on. On the 
other hand, that same caricature can be read as providing 
information about the person it stands for, a person 
therefore whose nose is long as noses go, though not that 
long, a person whose chin is weak as chins go, though not 
that weak. In fact two different systems of description are 
involved. One specifies a spatial form - but not the form of 
the subject- with metric accuracy; the other, relevant to the 
form of the subject, need speak only of trends. Exaggeration 
necessarily involves just these two levels of description. 
The interaction between description and reference is 
varied. Sometimes, description may be the means of refer-
ence. The descriptive trend information in the drawing is 
assimilated by the viewer's face recognition system, which 
accomplishes identification of the face. Sometimes, the 
descriptive role of a caricature may not begin until reference 
is accomplished. If the letter T is displayed with the caption 
"Charles Atlas," then clearly the T does not assume its role 
of caricaturing Atlas' physique until the reference is 
established. And more complex situations abound. For 
instance, a drawing prompts recognition, and then descriptive 
aspects of the drawing which were not involved in recogni-
tion become meaningful in the light of knowledge of the 
subject. 
The descriptive powers of caricature should not be 
considered just narrowly appropriate to pictorial comedy. 
For example, a study by Ryan and Schwartz (1956) 
compared accurate line drawings, photographs, shaded draw-
ings, and caricature-like "cartoons" as means of picturing 
complex spatial layouts, including machinery. The pictures 
were exposed tachistoscopically and the caricatures most 
successfully conveyed the general organization of the spatial 
layouts at shorter exposures. 
Furthermore, caricature-like techniques of exaggeration 
are actually employed in a number of communications 
contexts. Relief maps amplify the vertical scale. Photo-
graphers utilize contrast enhancement methods. Examples 
occur among pictograms used in international traffic warning 
signs, although however clear and emphatic these may appear 
to the acculturated viewer, Kolers (1969) warns us to be 
wary of any claim that such signs are universally readable. 
TRUTH AND REVELATION 
A true description is simply a description that specifies 
properties true of a referent. Portrait caricature, involving 
exaggeration as it does, is never a true description as far as 
metric accuracy is concerned. But a caricature may be a true 
trend description of its subject. Indeed, if a viewer remarks 
that a caricature doesn't look like its subject, he is not likely 
to mean that the drawing lies about the subject's exact 
metric shape; that is taken for granted. Similarly, if a drawing 
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depicts a political figure with a bulldozer body, it would 
probably be superfluous to complain that the bulldozer does 
not resemble the subject's body. Whether a picture, carica-
ture or not, offers true descriptions must always be judged 
relative to an analysis of the multiple kinds of descriptions it 
might offer. 
The aesthetic functioning of a caricature depends 
critically on the viewer's evaluation of its truth and falsity as 
description. (A corollary of this is that a caricature cannot be 
fully appreciated unless one is familiar with its subject's 
physiognomy). Humor in caricature serves as an example. If a 
caricature is not taken as a true trend description, then it 
becomes simply a funny face, lacking a manifest kernel of 
physiognomic truth. But if only the trend description is 
noted, there is no perceived overstatement to laugh at. 
A viewer's assent to a caricature as a trend description is 
not just a piecemeal matter, the nose approved but the 
cheeks not, and so on. Judgments of that sort can often be 
made, of course, but overall assent may depend as much on 
an interplay of features, a gestalt which itself cannot appear 
unless all or most of the contributing trends are themselves 
correct. Furthermore, a description false in some respects is 
brought into question as a whole. Those other propositions it 
offers which seem true, seem no more than accidentally true 
and lose their merit as commentary. None of this applies to 
the falsity of caricature as metric description; this falsity is 
recognized as part of the art form, is systematically separable 
from the trend description and does not bring it into 
question. 
When a viewer assents to a caricature's description, his 
assent lends credence to ascriptions of the drawing that the 
viewer does not have the knowledge to judge. This is entirely 
natural; one estimates the overall truth of the message from 
those parts of it that one can evaluate. But this phenomenon 
allows such misuses of caricature as the Nazi cartoons of 
Jews. The caricaturist may couch lies in the very visage itself, 
by selectively exaggerating his subject's features so as to 
suggest some personality trait such as meanness. If the viewer 
knows the subject, but has seen in his face or behavior no 
contrary personality indications, the viewer, recognizing the 
face, is likely to take the meanness as an aspect of the true 
face he had not noticed before, exposed by the art of the 
caricaturist. On the other hand, the sophisticated viewer will 
have learned to distrust ascriptions of personality in carica-
ture. That is a part of being sophisticated. 
In sum, the viewer's assent to, dissent to, or inability to 
evaluate a caricature's trend description plays an intimate 
role in his whole reaction to the work. In many cases of 
humor in caricature, the viewer's judgment of the falsity of 
the picture as metric description plays just as important a 
role. Further, the viewer's reaction is highly individual, 
depending on the prior knowledge and the habits of 
categorizing that he brings to his encounter with the picture, 
on his familiarity or lack of familiarity with the subject's 
face, his preconceptions about the subject's personality, the 
degree to which he separates physiognomic, political, 
personality, and other ascriptions, and separates metric from 
trend descriptions. The viewer's response is as much bound 
up in the information he has available and his general habits 
of information processing as it is in any exclusively aesthetic 
capacities he might have (if exclusively aesthetic capacities 
exist at all). 
This theme can be carried further yet. The fine caricature 
of Beckett as a buzzard, done by Levine and displayed in 
Figure 1, exemplifies "relevation." Levine has delivered a 
construction that reveals an unexpected visual affinity 
between Beckett's physiognomy and that of a buzzard, an 
affinity that gains depth because of Beckett's morose literary 
works. The example will be discussed further later, but 
certainly revelation is not limited to cases of representing a 
person as an animal, or as anything else at all. I particularly 
recall a caricature of Pushkin by Levine, where the ex-
aggeratedly large and limpid eyes led me suddenly to realize 
how those eyes dominated Push kin's face in realistic portray-
als. In sum, a caricature reveals when it exposes unnoticed 
physiognomic relationships, or the unrealized influence of 
particular features on the whole face, or the like. 
Accordingly, revelation is a frequent achievement of, but 
not a requirement for, caricature. In political cartoons, the 
same public figure may recur again and again in the same 
style. His reappearances, offering little further physiognomic 
revelation, accomplish other functions within the cartoon 
such as reference or expression. ' 
Some requirements of revelation can be specified in terms 
introduced earlier . . First, revelation is part of caricature as a 
description; that is, a caricature offers a proposition about a 
subject's physiognomy, such as, that it is like a buzzard's in 
certain respects. Second, the viewer must affirm the proposi-
tion; he does not reserve judgment or accept the proposition 
on faith as one might do when viewing a caricature of an 
unfamiliar subject. And third, the affirmation is not of an 
often entertained and tiresomely familiar proposition, but of 
freshly revealed truth. In sum, the caricature entices the 
viewer into affirming a novel proposition. 
Why is a novel proposition affirmed? Relating the 
proposition to accumulated knowledge is required: for 
instance, the proposition may complete a pattern of other 
propositions; it may neatly sum up a co llection of sub-
ordinate propositions, as does the Buzzard-Beckett equation; 
it may bring into focus a series of half-realized prior 
observations, as with my reaction to Pushkin's eyes. What-
ever the relation to prior knowledge, it is a characteristic of 
revelation that the very organization of the viewer's per-
ception is changed. Just as, after identifying a camouflaged 
figure, it is very difficult to recover one's original naive 
perception, so Pushkin and Beckett will never appear as 
they did, or not for a long time. In its very rapid, but 
long-term, reorganization of the viewer's perceptions, revela-
tion contrasts with more gradual and painful means of 
shifting one's perceptions of the world. 
Revelation, important throughout the arts, is related to 
discovery as the word would be used in science or 
philosophy. Both revelation and discovery involve ap-
prehending a new structure or coherence in a body of 
accumulated information. Revelation emphasizes some 
agent's role in serving up the novel proposition, whereas 
discovery emphasizes the creative role of the apprehender in 
devising his own coherence. A discovery "comes as a 
revelation" just when the creator is largely unconscious of his 
own constructive role. Recent research (Muller, Kennedy, 
and Tanimoto 1972) has demonstrated that persons prefer 
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viewing sequences of pictures where initially distorted, 
unrecognizable letters become recognizable over viewing the 
reverse sequences, even though they judge the unrecognized 
distorted letters as by themselves more interesting than 
undistorted but readily identifiable letters. Discovery, that is, 
is valued for itself, independently of the value attached to 
the content discovered. Each of us can echo this subjectively; 
discovery and revelation are rewarding, often exciting ex-
periences. This is one source of affect in caricature and in art 
in general. 
In considering revelation, there is no need to confine the 
viewer to a passive role. If he does not invent the proposition 
that the caricaturist lays before him, at least he must read it 
out of the caricature, and furthermore he must relate it to his 
own knowledge and perceive that the proposition does lend 
that knowledge coherence or structure. These operations of 
the viewer are themselves active, constructive, and creative. 
Every revelation by an agent is to that extent a discovery by 
the recipient. Again, a viewer's response to a caricature 
emerges as a highly judgmental process very concerned with 
fact and logic; his prior information and information 
processing habits will determine whether he discovers what 
the caricaturist aimed to reveal. 
EXAGGERATION AND INDIVIDUATION 
In discussing how caricatures are "read," the previous 
sections have underscored the central roles of exaggeration 
and individuation. In employing exaggeration, caricatures 
provide a trend description but not a metric description of 
their subjects. And by providing a true trend description, 
caricatures individuate. 
At once it is clear that exaggeration must not be taken 
narrowly, for instance, to mean "making larger., Caricatures 
of aggressive chins may be larger, but weak chins are 
--......_rendered weaker yet. Some general techniques of ex-
aggeration are: making darker or lighter, larger or smaller, 
longer or shorter, and accentuating contours- special cases of 
this include rendering hair curlier or the profile more 
pronounced. Non-physical traits, as of personality or expres-
sion, can also be exaggerated. 
In all these cases, exaggeration involves displacement 
along a scale measuring (if crudely) some property. More 
generally, exaggeration could be defined in terms of a partial 
ordering relation on mutually exclusive classifications of 
some classification system. If a symbol exaggerates, it refers 
to a certain subject, but read according to convention, it also 
implies a measurement (classification) of the subject not in 
fact cqrrect, but greater than or less than the correct mea-
surement. 
But merely distortion is involved if for the same subject 
and circumstances "greater than, and "less than, are not 
differentiated. Overstating the role of alcohol in accidents is 
exaggerating that role, but an understatement does not 
exaggerate the role. Neither is what counts as exaggeration a 
question of conventional "greater than" scale directions for 
various scales; as mentioned above, exaggerated strong chins 
are stronger, exaggerated weak chins are weaker. Rather, 
exaggeration seems to involve implicit reference to a "normal 
point" on a scale; the exaggerated symbol indicates a 
measurement for a subject which is, starting from the normal 
point, beyond the subject's correct measurement. When the 
scale has an endpoint (e.g., zero on a length scale), in some 
contexts this endpoint serves as the norm and there is only 
one direction of exaggeration. In other contexts exaggeration 
is relative to interior normal points suggested by population 
averages, or by conventions of beauty or health, or the like. 
Exaggeration aside, how can scales and normal points 
individuate? Common usage provides a clue. We speak of 
people as tall or short, fat or thin, and so forth, with implicit 
reference to an average height or build. In this way, a scale 
like height and a normal point like the average height allow 
us to individuate members of a population. Of course, many 
scales and norms have no individuating value. In a cartooning 
context where all noses get longer, the normal point for 
exaggeration is zero nose length. But no one has less than 
zero nose length, the scale and norm do not divide the 
population, and the cartoons exaggerate without truly 
caricaturing. From a standpoint of general informational 
efficiency, the population median provides the most in-
dividuating norm. But for any number of reasons, other 
normal points may be used in sorting: the basketball coach's_ 
professional standards for "tall" versus "short" will be high. 
Caricature involves a triad: the cartoon itself, the subject 
caricatured, and scales and individuating norms (often 
determined by a standard population) against which the 
subject is measured. The caricaturist selects cert'ain of these 
~scales and exaggerates along these scales the departure of his 
subject from the normal points. Accordingly, the same 
subject against a different population might be caricatured 
quite differently; Gulliver is a giant among the pygmies and a 
pygmy among the giants. Another consequence is the 
traditional remark that people with especially ordinary 
features are hard to caricature; many of their measurements 
fall on the norm points and no proper direction for 
exaggeration is defined. 
Even for other subjects, the circumstances may not 
unambiguously suggest the scales and norms against which an 
artist should work; he may have to choose. For example, 
suppose an artist aims to caricature a profile which is rather 
flat as profiles go (Figure 4, center). Among many alterna-
tives, he might choose to work from the human average, and 
render the profile flatter yet (Figure 4, right). Or he might 
take a straight line- the average of all wavy lines- as his 
origin, and accentuate the contours (Figure 4, left). It seems 
plausible that either manipulation, in its own way, might 
contribute to a recognizable caricature. 
The viewer as well as the artist has problems and options. 
In seeing how a caricature is exaggerated, he faces the task of 
determining the scales and norms with respect to which 
exaggeration was attempted. Does a certain drawing depict a 
nose exaggerated in length, an ear-nose distance exaggerated, 
a tip-of-nose exaggerated, or what? Such questions are 
resolved (with an element of arbitrary choice perhaps) by 
cues in the pictures themselves, by knowledge of conventions 
of picturing and caricaturing, and through intuitions about 
what sorts of scales and norms are psychologically likely. To 
say just that much is to touch a complex matter lightly. 
Although "reading" a picture as exaggerated is a largely 
automatic and unconscious accomplishment, substantial 
cognitive activity is clearly involved. 
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Figure 4 -Exaggeration relative to different norms 
But just that much is enough for the present purpose, 
illuminating caricature. The thrust of this section can be 
condensed into two definitions. A scale and norm, relative to 
a given population, are individuating just when the members 
of the population do not all have measurements on the scale 
less than, equal to, or greater than the norm. And a symbol 
referring to an individual, describing a measurement along a 
scale, and relative to a given norm, exaggerates just when the 
individual's true measurement on the scale lies between the 
described measurement and the norm. Of course, this is an 
abstract from the realities of the human condition, where 
judgments of degree are uncertain and normal points 
indefinite intervals. 
DEFINITION 
The prior sections lend support to a formal definition. A 
symbol referring to an individual and relative to a given scale, 
norm, and population is a caricature just when the scale and 
norm relative to the population are individuating and the 
symbol relative to the individual scale and norm exaggerates. 
Of course, a symbol is called a caricature not just because of 
one- perhaps coincidental-measurement. Therefore, a 
symbol referring to an individual and relative to a whole set 
of scales, norms, and populations is a caricature just when it 
is a caricature with respect to some of those scales, norms, 
and populations and accurate with respect to the others. For 
a capsule statement and leaving some terms implicit, a 
caricature is a symbol that exaggerates measurements relative t 
to individuating norms. This definition is not new; an 
essential equivalent was given by Samuel Johnson (Lynch 
1927:1 ). Nor is it a radical departure from the trend of prior 
proposals. It simply says a little less than some, for instance 
in omitting humor, and a little more than others, for instance 
in insisting on the central role of exaggeration for individua-
tion's sake. 
The definition functions by paring away pretenders to the 
name "caricature," to reduce the concept to its most central 
core. First of all, the definition requires reference. Certain 
sorts of pictures are at once excluded: grotesque faces, 
gargoyles, harpies, monsters of various breeds, and so forth. 
Referring to no subject, they cannot ascribe properties to 
that subject and hence cannot deliver humor, revelation, or 
expression of personality in the manner of true caricature. 
Of course, realistic pictures and photographs refer to and 
describe their subjects. But such pictures are not usually 
called caricatures, and the exaggeration requirement excludes 
these. Also, exaggeration emphasizes that caricatures occur in 
the context of an established system of "more accurate" 
representation. Caricature is not simply a trend description, 
but a trend description by means of exaggeration, a means 
which uses as its instrument the metric descriptive powers of 
picturing. 
Exaggeration by itself leaves some problems, however. 
Portraying a person of average or smaller nose length and ear 
size as having a long nose and large ears might prompt a 
laugh, but cannot gain the viewer's affirmation of true 
description that is so intimately involved in humor in 
caricature, as discussed earlier. Such exaggeration does not 
provide description differentiating between that particular 
subject and any other, information necessary for most of the 
other functions of caricature as well as humor. The insistence 
that caricature exaggerate with respect to individuating 
norms excludes drawings which to not attempt such dif-
ferentiation. 
Just as caricature denies transformations which exaggerate 
without individuating, so it denies transformations which 
individuate without exaggerating. For instance, an artist may 
eliminate details of a face in order to throw the broader 
. structural features into prominence. True, the manipulation 
packages some individuating properties of the subject for 
easy perceptual access. But the means of packaging is 
critically different. Many portraits which would never be 
called caricatures use such simplification, and though carica-
turists often simplify as well as exaggerating, everythinga 
caricaturist does need not be strictly caricature. 
Finally, the relation between caricature as an abstraction 
and caricature in a human context must be explored. In light 
of the formal definition, the casual question "Is such-and-
such symbol a caricature?" is badly formed, incomplete 
unless symbol systems, scales, norms, and so forth are 
specified. Most any symbol will be a caricature with respect 
to some trumped up specifications. But informally asking 
whether a symbol is a caricature makes implicit reference to 
our system of pictorial representation, the populations out of 
which subjects must be differentiated, and the scales and 
norms we routinely employ in perceiving and making 
judgments about pictures or real world scenes. 
Certainly to be avoided is an oversimple conception of 
seeing a picture as a caricature, where a visual system 
methodically and exhaustively checks through some list of 
norms and scales to see whether the picture fits the 
definition. A prime concern of the viewer is to make sense of 
the picture, to determine its referent, and the relation 
between referent and subject. If the viewer can discover 
several scales and norms with respect to which the picture is 
a caricature, and notices few other scales and norms where 
the picture seems merely distorted (though there are almost 
bound to be many} then he will construe the picture as 
caricature. Therefore, whatever scales, norms and so forth a 
psychologist might list as "usually attended to," some 
pictures would formally be caricatures with respect to this 
list without always being recognized as such, some pictures 
would not formally be caricatures without the discrepancies 
always being noticed, and some pictures would be caricatures 
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with respect to scales not on the list, but brought to the 
attention of the viewer by the caricaturist's skill. 
ANIMAL CARICATURES AND CARTOONS 
The definition of caricature, abstracted from several 
crucial examples, should now prove its ability to analyze 
cases not figuring in its conception. Previously, various sorts 
of pictures were placed relative to caricature: portraits refer, 
describe their referents, but do not exaggerate; grotesques 
may exaggerate norms of ugliness but do not refer to or 
exaggerate an individual; and so on. Now the definition may 
be tried on a fresh domain, the cluster of problems 
surrounding the use of animal-like figures in caricatures and 
cartoons. Levine's buzzard caricature of Beckett has already 
been introduced, but the logical status of such a mix of 
human and animal characteristics was not discussed and 
remains puzzling. 
Drawings wherein a recognizable subject is presented 
wearing the clothes-as it were-of an animal, are often 
especially engaging. Such drawings are generally called 
caricatures, but whether or not they merit the name in the 
technical sense proposed here is a subtle issue. A further 
example appears in Figure 5 from Gombrich 
(1963: 213-214), who comments on its economy. Establish-
ing reference with such a drawing depends on (1) a few 
effective clues- the cigarette holder, the smile, the tilt of the 
chin, (2) a context of current events and conventional 
symbols-the donkey, and (3) absence of counterevidence. 
The interplay between (1) and (3) is worth stressing. 
Recognition can take place with very few clues so long as 
features in the picture serving solely humor or other purposes 
(e.g., the ears of the donkey) are not taken to be attributes 
of the subject's real face. 
Cartoons of this sort have at their heart a pun-like double 
reference, both to Beckett and buzzard, to Roosevelt and 
donkey, and so forth. In Goodman's terms (1968:27-41), 
Figure 1 denotes Beckett but is also a buzzard picture, and 
pictures may represent individuals not only as animals, but as 
buildings, volcanos, machinery, and so on. But how does 
such double-reference relate to caricature, construed as the 
exaggeration of measures relative to individuating norms? 
Clearly "double reference" and "exaggeration of mea-
sures ... " are logically different formulas, inviting a search 
for instances of one without the other. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the "double reference" notion about a natural 
resemblance between the two entities referred to. Figure 5 is 
an apt example. For the second point, the characteristics of 
the picture that identify Roosevelt are not those that 
identify donkeys. The Roosevelt features are grafted on, so 
to speak, and the drawing turns on no particular natural 
resemblance between donkeys and Roosevelt. Returning to 
the first point, the Roosevelt features themselves are little 
exaggerated, at least as compared to the accompanying 
photograph. There is the lengthened cigarette holder, but on 
the whole the picture is not much "caricatured" in our sense. 
Levine's Beckett-as-Buzzard (Figure 1) is a contrasting 
case. Here several characteristics of the drawing perform 
double duty, describing both buzzards and Beckett. The 
beak-nose, the neck and chin, the facial wrinkles, and even 
the collar, are examples. Further, the portraying of the 
buzzard, accomplishing the animal reference, goes hand in 
hand with exaggeration of individuating trends of Beckett's 
face. Finally, implicit in the choice of buzzard is the 
exaggeration of personality characteristics of Beckett as 
reflected in his work. 
In qualification, it is worth noting that the ears, so 
emphasized in the caricature of Beckett on the right of 
Figure 1, are reduced in the buzzard-Beckett so as to avoid 
an absurdly large-eared buzzard; the buzzard's ears seem even 
smaller than Beckett's true ears. Further, the buzzard version 
is certainly less recognizable all in all than the other, and 
functions particularly well when placed beside it. As always, 
there is this tension between manipulations for the sake of 
humor or personality comment and manipulations for the 
sake of individuation. As remarked earlier, many drawings 
caricaturing several measurements would merely distort 
others. But in the balance, the Beckett-buzzard caricatures a 
Figure 5 -F. D. Roosevelt 
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number of scales we are likely to attend to, while missing on 
but a few. Applying the definition with the recommended 
tolerance, the cartoon is a caricature. 
The fact remains that established practice would label the 
Roosevelt-donkey a caricature. This simply says that we have 
two alternative standards for caricature: individuating ex-
aggeration and double reference. This paper restricts the term 
"caricature" to the first standard as the more commonly 
applicable one. But that is ultimately a matter of philo-
sophical strategy and choice. However the word is used, the 
puzzling case of animal caricatures is resolved by recognizing 
that history has established two alternative standards rather 
than one. 
Animal cartoon characters fail both standards; usually 
they do not involve double reference, nor are they usually 
caricatures in the present sense. A drawing of Donald Duck is 
no.t intended to be identified as anybody but Donald Duck (a 
fictional construct created by a series of such pictures) and is 
certainly an accurate, not an exaggerated, portrayal of him. 
True, Donald and many other cartoon characters exhibit a 
mixture of various animal and human features, often 
distorted - web feet and too-wide bill, the frontally located 
eyes, and arms with four-fingered hands. The result of course 
is a creature that is neither much of a duck or much of a 
human, as Mad cartoonist Bill Elder points out in Figure 6. 
T~~ .:~~~WJ'';f~eove~ 
AND FUNNY THING! ... IT MAIHA6E.~..I!..-
ALMOST .SOUNDeD LII<E IT 
WAS TALKING... I. If<~ IT WAS 
SAYING 11GET N\f: SACK MY 
aOTHES ~ OR SOM!lHJN6 .1 
Figure 6 -Donald and other ducks 
But Donald in shape is no effort to caricature either a duck 
or a human, though his actions may caricature human 
foibles. The distortions and mixing of human and animal 
features must be attributed to different aims. One of these is 
clearly the anthropomorphizing of the animal form, so that it 
will appear less alien (the frontal eyes are important here!}, 
can manipulate objects with hands, and so on. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The context so far has been the pictorial caricaturing of 
individual physiognomies. But the term caricature has a 
wider application than that. First of all, a caricature need not 
be pictorial. A mimic may offer an overblown version of his 
subject's voice and gestures; a writer may satirize another's 
work by exaggerating his idiosyncracies of style. Such efforts 
can certainly be called caricatures. And the usage does not 
reveal limitations in the present definition, because that 
definition nowhere requires pictorial symbols. The general-
ization is already there. 
Caricatures of fictive individuals-Clark Kent, for in-
stance-also occur. A generalization to accommodate this 
case comes fairly easily. If pictures of Clark Kent denote 
nothing, at least they are still descriptions of three-
dimensional shapes which collectively and pretty consistently 
establish what the Clark Kent face shape is. Accordingly, that 
shape can be caricatured much as any other face shape. Such 
a caricature, of course, can't be said to denote Clark Kent 
any more than a "realistic" picture of Clark Kent does. But 
both can be treated as fictive representations, for instance, in 
the manner discussed by Goodman (1968:21-26). 
However, some fictive individuals-Donald Duck, per-
haps-may be quite difficult to caricature in any strict sense. 
With Clark Kent, the usual norms of human appearance may 
be invoked. But what norms apply to Donald Duck, when he 
is one of a kind? Certainly one can make distorted pictures 
of Donald Duck, but the distinction between individuating 
exaggeration and mere distortion tends to collapse. 
This leaves the present formulation constrained to carica-
tures of individuals, real or fictive. But caricatures of classes 
are commonplace. The Nazi caricatures of Jews from 
Gombrich (1963) have already been mentioned. Today blue 
collar workers, hippies, intellectuals, and dozens of other 
groups are routinely lampooned by the caricaturist's art. 
Figure 7 offers a contemporary example. Ideals like 
''beauty" or concepts like "cold war" can also be carica-
tured. Unfortunately, the easy substitution of "class" for 
"individual" in the present definition does not yield an 
adequate generalization. Caricatures of classes simply involve 
more complex symbolic relationships, and require a more 
general construal of the concepts exaggeration and individua-
tion. 
" ... SON ... I" " ••. DAD •.• I" 
Figure 7 - A caricature of classes 
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These concepts, as well as those of describing, revealing, 
truth judgments, and so on discussed earlier, have been the 
instruments for drawing a fairly sharp line around the notion 
of caricature of individuals. Certainly that line's placement 
has been guided by a personal intuition, but not an arbitrary 
one. The aim has been to systematically respect evident gulfs 
between the T which is not a description and the hulking T 
labelled Charles Atlas; between grotesques depicting no 
subject and equally monstrous images lampooning a victim; 
between the mere lie of the child's monster picture labelled 
"teacher" and the truth-in-lie of caricature; between draw-
!ngs that in simplifying characterize and drawings that in 
exaggerating caricature; between pictures merely half-animal, 
half-man-the Roosevelt-donkey- and pictures with parts 
simultaneously animal and man-the Beckett-buzzard. The 
logic of the analysis hopefully does not blur or ignore, but 
rather delineates and explains, caricature as a unique art 
form. 
PART II 
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 
With all their distortions, we recognize caricatures. The 
puzzle is how. But perhaps the emphasis on caricature as the 
thing to be accounted for is wrong. Caricature recognition 
need not be explained as some adaptation, adjustment or 
success-in-the-face-of-adversity of the normal recognition 
process. One can turn the issue upside down and suggest that 
caricature recognition is a full manifestation of the normal 
recognition process, which is itself to be explained. And 
caricatures provide a means of investigation. The caricaturist 
is a natural experimenter, exploring distortions for the sake 
of satire, expression of personality, and so forth, while also 
meeting the need to deliver an identifiable image. In 
diverging from accuracy but preserving identity, his works 
provide a measure of which facial properties are important 
to identification. 
The aim here is to explore these physiognomic invariants, 
these constancies between caricature and subject and 
between one caricature and another of the same subject. The 
approach is analogous to that of J. J. Gibson ( 1950, 1966) 
who bases his analysis of visual processes on invariants in the 
optic array. But the sources of perturbation across which 
constancies are sought are not only the shifting perspectives 
of the viewer and changing illumination. The transforma-
tions are provided by the caricaturist, and the search for 
constancies encouraged by his need to supply an identifiable 
work in spite of these transformations, or even by means of 
them. 
E. J. Gibson's work (1969:102-105) provides a framework 
for restating the subject in another way. She, like myself, 
feels that the recognition of caricatures can be explained vi a 
the normal face recognition process. Caricaturists exaggerate 
"distinctive features" of the human face , those features by 
means of which viewers discriminate face from face and 
identify individuals. Choosing its own terminology, this 
paper will speak of individuating "properties" or "attributes" 
of the face, taking the terms in the broadest sense and as 
synonymous. 
Like sonnet or sonata, this approach is a form needing 
explicit content to be meaningful. Of necessity, recognition 
depends on individuating properties of the stimulus. On what 
else could it depend? The essential questions are which and 
what sorts of attributes contribute to identification. Many 
alternative sets of properties may be logically adequate bases 
for discrimination over a given range of stimulus materials. 
Which properties are psychologically relevant must be deter-
mined. These could vary from culture to culture, or even 
from perceiver to perceiver. But the very phenomenon of 
caricature recognition suggests that at least within a culture, 
constancies prevail and await discovery. 
Any such quest must acknowledge that a caricature 
incorporates many devices irrelevant to recognition . Certain 
features of caricatures are better accounted for as purely 
comic devices, as conventions of cartooning, as means of 
expressing personality, or in like ways. Furthermore, some 
apt caricatures require the assistance of labels and other cues, 
because the subject is not well known or because the 
caricature abstracts too far from the subject's appearance-
consider a large capital T labelled "Charles Atlas." If 
recognition from the image itself plays an important role in 
caricature, there is no pretense that it is the only role. But 
that role is the focus of this study. 
A search for individuating attributes also demands respect 
for the alternative hypothesis, that caricature recognition 
occurs in spite of, and not because of, the selective 
transformations wrought by the caricaturist. Perhaps a viewer 
must become familiar with the distortions caricaturists 
generally employ, so that he may discount this false 
evidence. Perhaps the viewer must learn that certain informa-
tion is generally absent, in order not to be confused by that 
absence. Perhaps he must learn that caricatures often tell lies 
in ways not involving exaggeration, such as displaying the 
wrong number of wrinkles on a forehead. In short, possibly a 
successful reading of caricatures depends on a sophisticated 
familiarity with the genre . 
The argument will be that this is not true to any great 
extent. The circumstantial evidence points strongly to this 
conclusion. However, the gleeful exploration of the carica-
turist is not the methodical manipulation of the scientist. 
Neither is the response of his audience carefully surveyed and 
quantified. Perfectly rigorous findings must emerge from 
more engineered circumstances, in which both the drawings 
presented and the responses of viewers are subject to 
systematic control and analysis. The present paper will 
perhaps point directions into such research, and anticipate 
some of its conclusions. 
AN EXAMPLE 
As leader of the United States government, the President 
seems always to acquire the uncomfortable status of "most 
caricatured person." When this work began in 1970, cartoons 
representing President Richard Nixon proved far more 
available than those of anyone else, and a large collection of 
these provided the basis for the study. Later on, some 
tentative generalizations will be made from consideration of 
this one case ; the reader may judge their plausibility for 
himself. But one point deserves emphasis: this study con-
cerns recognition of very well known faces and hence 
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concerns highly practiced acts of identification. Results will 
require at least minor adjustments if applied to recognition 
of less familiar or just learned faces. The caricaturist is well 
aware of this difference. Paul Szep, political cartoonist for 
the Boston Globe, has remarked to me that he can exercise 
much more freedom in his treatment of a very well known 
face. Less prominent public figures allow less latitude and 
require more care if the caricaturist's effort is to prompt 
recognition. 
Mapping the relationships between caricature recognition 
and the recognition of normal faces requires first of all 
answers to two questions: which attributes of caricatu res of 
the President distinguish them from caricatures of other 
individuals, and do those attributes represent exaggerated 
properties of the President's true face? The treatment of the 
nose is particularly interesting here. Figures 8(a-l) are in most 
respects typical. First of all, the nose is long, but also quite 
narrow. Such a shape is remarkably uncommon in caricature 
in general, the usual "big nose" being much broader at the 
base, large but not as thin. But the properties of thinness and 
elongation are common to almost all caricature presentations 
of President Nixon's nose. There is a further attribute, 
common again to nearly all caricatures of the President, but 
also not infrequent in caricature in general: the nose slopes 
downward from the root. 
The swelling toward the tip of this example and the 
upward curl of the bridge are properties not as persistent as 
the above, but nevertheless common devices occurring in 
somewhat better than half of the cartoons examined. A final 
feature frequent in caricatures of the President is the vertical 
seam in the tip of the nose. 
These observations argue that the treatment of the nose 
does not merely invoke general conventions like an eye 
represented by a dotted circle. Rather, several properties of 
the nose are relatively specific to caricatures of the President. 
The next section will pursue how important these properties 
are to recognition. Here, the question remains whether the 
attributes are simply conventions specific to the President, or 
whether the caricatures reflect features of the real face. If 
they do, this supports the interpretation that caricature 
recognition borrows the normal recognition process. 
Figures 9a through 9f present profile, three-quarter, and 
full-face photographs of the President. The representation-
in-caricature of the nose as long and narrow seems amply 
justified by the profile and three-quarter views. These 
properties are not as evident in the full face photographs, 
which instead display the rather broad structure of the nose. 
More on this later. Most views show that the bottom edge of 
the nose slopes markedly down toward the lip, a feature 
common to most of the caricatures investigated. The 
occasional vertical seam in the tips of caricature noses is 
evident in Figures 9d, though few of the photos examined 
were sharp enough to contain this detail. An upward curl is 
also apparent in the photographs. The bridge of the nose near 
the eyes is distinctly more vertical than near the tip. 
Examination of photographs of other men reveals that this is 
not generally so. 
However, the bulb end is dubious as a caricatured feature 
of the real face. Photographs 9a and 9d offer no signs of such 
a physiognomic structure. Photographs 9b and 9c might be 
t:;:)~~~::i: 
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Figure 8a -by Haynie 
Figure 8b - by Szep 
Figure Be - by Feiffer Figure 8d - by Feiffer 
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thought to do so. But this is an illusion, a consequence of the 
dark nostril denting the profile of the nose. Just the same 
effect is apparent in photographs of other men with varying 
types of noses. Whether the bulb end contributes at all to 
recognition still remains somewhat uncertain. The bulb might 
express some property other than shape- a fleshy quality for 
example. But of course, there is no need to account for 
everything in terms of recognition. Comedy is reason enough 
in caricature. Such features as the seam, the elongation, the 
downward slope, the curl, are on the face of it aspects 
Figure Be - by Oliphant 
Figure 8f 
Figure 8g 
- by Drucker 
common to caricature and man. If this is not so of the bulb, 
or at least not obviously so, then the feature can readily be 
ascribed to objectives other than recognizability . 
Full face caricatures of President Nixon pose an in-
teresting problem for cartoonists. Above, it was remarked 
that the long nose, a nearly universal feature of the 
caricatures, was not apparent in the full face photographs. 
Logically it should not occur in full face caricatures. The 
natural expectation is that the cartoonist would caricature a 
view as seen, indicating the wide nose with the tip dipping 
well below the sides, but sacrificing indication of length. But 
only one cartoonist to my present knowledge has taken this 
course, Jules Feiffer (Figure 8c}. 
What is the alternative? An obvious ploy is for the 
caricaturist to avoid the full face view, and indeed the full 
face view proves quite uncommon. But there are other 
means. Figure 8g displays a caricature that is unquestionably 
full face except in one respect. The artist, Mort Drucker, has 
cocked the nose slightly to the right in order to portray its 
length. Challenging the geometry of the viewpoint, he insists 
on displaying an attribute he thinks to be important for his 
caricature. 
Feiffer does much the same in reverse. Just as Drucker 
brings his particular conception of the nose, suggested by 
three-quarter or profile views, to full face caricature views, so 
does Feiffer employ his wide nose style in three-quarter 
caricature views as well as full face. Figure 8d is an example. 
Thus each artist emphasizes different properties of the nose, 
and extends this emphasis to viewpoints where, in a 
photograph, these properties would not be as apparent. 
Figure 8h - by Hungerford 
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Figure 8i -by Lurie 
Figure 8j -by Drucker 
Figure 8k -by Szep 
Figure 81 - by Herb/ock 
The hairline and hair also appear to contribute to 
recognition. The photographs present the contour of the 
hairline clearly. A very distinctive lock runs back along the 
center of the forehead, a lock surrounded on either side by 
bays. Viewing photos of other men of similar age reveals that 
such a hairline contour in this pronounced degree is quite 
unusual. Almost all cartoonists drawing the President have 
capitalized on the uniqueness of the hairline by rendering it 
in their cartoons. A deepening and rounding out of the bays 
is the most prevalent means of exaggeration. Almost all 
caricaturists do this. Slightly narrowing the center lock is 
another common device. Fairly often cartoonists will also 
represent waves in the hair, glossiness, and highlights (Figure 
8a). Indeed properties of the real hair as photographs 9c and 
9d illustrate, often are not indicated at all. 
Well worth stressing is that the hairline with the nose, or 
even by itself, seems remarkably distinctive of the President. 
Caricaturist Haynie offers us in Figure 1 Oa President Nixon 
clearly recognizable from just the nose up. Concealing either 
the hair or the nose with a finger gives some idea of the 
relative importance of the two features, suggesting that the 
hair, for a single feature, provides the viewer with a 
considerable amount of distinguishing information. 
The modest jowls evident in the photographs are treated 
by virtually all caricaturists. The jowls, like the nose, are 
subject not only to accentuation for recognition's sake, but 
for humor's sake as well. In the popular three-quarter view, 
the jowls are rendered by indicating the bulge in the profile 
of the cheek, and, near the mouth, by proper manipulation 
of the facial creases from the nose to the tip of the mouth 
and from the tip of the mouth down toward the chin. 
Sometimes one of these creases is omitted, or the two are 
combined into one. Essentially the same technique serves in 
full face views (Figure 8g). The degree of exaggeration varies 
from the relatively benign Figure 8a, to the utterly grotes-
que, as in Figures 8e or 8f. 
Earlier the awkwardness of portraying the elongate nose 
in full face caricatures was discussed. Problems of full face 
versus three-quarter versus profile views arise again with the 
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cheeks. In photographs, neither the full face nor the profile 
view displays the jowls distinctly. In full face, this situation 
has dismayed caricaturists not at all. They proceed to employ 
their normal techniques for the cheeks as mentioned above, 
ignoring the fact that the jowls are less visible in full face. 
The profile photographs, however, suggest difficulties; in 
these the jowls though visible are apparent largely through 
shading, a device not so much in the cartoonist's repertoire as 
is pure line. Near omission (Figure 8j) or extreme exaggera-
tion so that the cheek profile shows (Figure 8k), are two 
resolutions. Caricaturist Herblock offers a third of particular 
interest. The lacing of wrinkles apparent in Figure 81 serves 
to indicate the jowls even in a profile view. These wrinkles 
are not at all evident features of the real face. In a few of the 
photographs examined, there was the hint of a single crease 
dropping from the eye along the side of the cheek. Even in 
those cases, there was only one. The truth-in-1 ie nature of 
caricature was never so bald. These creases, lying as they do 
about themselves as specific features, nevertheless succeed in 
conveying the slump of the cheek. 
Figures 9a-f 
- Photographs of 
President Richard Nixon 
d 
e 
f 
However, the general trend is that caricaturists employ a 
three-quarter view, ::1nd part of the reason surely is that the 
nose is difficult in full face and the cheeks awkward in 
profile. Of some 38 caricatures of the President examined for 
this work, only five were full face or nearly full face, and 
only six were profile views. Paul Szep has told me that in 
general a three-quarter likeness is usually easier than one in 
profile or full face. Rother (1966), in a "how-to-do-it" article 
promotes the three-quarter view. Berger says that the profile 
comes easiest- a. minority opinion (Berger 1952). At least in 
examples presented here, advantages of the three-quarter 
view relate to particular difficulties in representing specific 
properties of the face. 
A further attribute common to almost all caricatures of 
President Nixon is a "box chin." Figure 8g exemplifies, 
portraying the tip of the chin as protruding below the basic 
line of the jaw. The effect is often quite pronounced in the 
caricatures, so that as in this example, the borders of the box 
chin become vertical before touching the jawline. A look at 
the photographs supports the box chin as a property of the 
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Figure 70 -A partial view 
true face. The tip of the chin in the photographic profiles 
clearly depends below the jawline. In the three-quarter and 
full-face views, the seams dropping from either side of the 
mouth, and a slight shift in the angle of the jawline, serve to 
set off an area in the front of the jaw. 
Several attributes of Nixon's face in caricature and 
in fact have been considered in some detail. Several others 
deserve brief mention. Prominent in the former President, as 
in many others, are the creases running from the sides of the 
nose to the sides of the lips. Caricaturists generally represent 
these, and use them to emphasize the cheeks as remarked 
earlier. A less common pair of creases can be observed in the 
photograph of Figure 9d falling from the sides of the lips 
toward the chin. Caricaturists often, but not always, offer 
these lines as well. Occasionally these two lines are combined 
into one- Figure 8f. 
The horizontal crease, or near-crease, falling between 
Nixon's lower lip and chin is often depicted in caricature; 
this again is a feature common to many human faces. The 
cartoonists further generally supply crow's feet and furrows 
in the forehead. These are rarely apparent in photographs, 
but are real enough and can be seen in the particularly sharp 
photograph of Figure 9d. There seems little effort to 
replicate the exact patterns of these creases. 
Further features near the eyes are of interest. The 
eyebrows are dark, and have a distinctive shape, rising from 
the middle toward the sides, peaking and then hooking down 
again. A number of caricaturists represent this contour (see, 
for example, Figure 8g). But better than half do not, even 
though it would seem a plausible contribution to recogni-
tion-indeed, Rother (1966) claims that the eyebrows are 
often an especially effective point of identification. Almost 
all photographs reveal distinct bags under the eyes. Some 
caricaturists represent these, but just as often not. Again this 
is somewhat surprising, since this feature like the eyebrows 
seems a priori fully as evident and characteristic as the nose 
and perhaps more so than the box chin. Thus there are 
various potentially distinguishing features of the President's 
physiognomy that are just as often omitted as used by 
caricaturists. 
THE QUESTION OF NECESSITY 
The four attributes, elongate nose, jowls, contoured 
hairline, and box chin, occur persistently in caricatures of 
President Nixon and not in caricatures of others. The 
features reflect real properties of his face. These observations 
suggest that the attributes make a genuine contribution to 
recognition. But a more careful test is in order. In logical 
terms, to what extent are these attributes necessary for a 
portrait caricature to be recognized as the former President, 
and to what extent are they sufficient for a portrait 
cariacture to be so recognized? The first half of this question 
is the concern just now. 
An interesting observation, but not an answer to the 
question, is that among the professional caricatures ex-
amined, having most of the four properties mentioned above 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a portrait 
caricature to be an effort (however successful) at caricaturing 
President Nixon. This is simply a rephrasing of the fact that 
all the samples of Nixon caricatures do have most of these 
properties and no samples of non-Nixon caricatures have 
most of them. But fundamentally this is a statement about 
the behavior of the artists. In spite of their habits, perhaps 
fewer of these attributes would do. 
Then what is the effect of eliminating one or all of the 
four "key" properties from various "good" caricatures of the 
President? Figure 11 is a sample. There, 11 a represents a 
tracing of the original caricature (Figure 8a). Figure 11 b 
copies the original except that is has been redrawn to alter all 
four attributes. Further 11 c, d, e, and f copy the original 
except that, respectively, jowls, hairline, box chin, and 
elongate nose have been redrawn. Clearly the modifying of 
all four in 11b utterly destroys its recognizability. For a 
single attribute, absence of jowls in 4c perhaps most degrades 
the resemblance, and the hairline in 4d the least impairs it. In 
all cases, there is a marked detriment. Similar manipulations 
of other caricatures bear out these observations. 
Simple absence of one or more. of these four properties is 
not the degrading factor. Recall the success of Figure 10. It is 
not the invisibility of the key properties, but their replace-
ment by counter-properties that degrades the resemblance by 
providing inappropriate clues. But some other properties 
logically just as distinctive (e.g., the eyebrows) may be 
completely misrepresented with little if any effect on 
identification. 
What is the conclusion about the necessity of these four 
properties? One might say casually that they- and perhaps 
others- are "rather necessary" or "mostly necessary ." The 
equivocation is essential. A cartoon may indicate an at-
tribute, contra-indicate it (i.e., indicate something incom-
patible with it) or give no information about it. If each of the 
four features is necessary in any ser,se, the sense is not that 
each must necessarily be present. Rather, no feature must be 
contra-indicated. 
Of course, even this is too strong. Contra-indication of 
one or two attributes may leave a substantial resemblance 
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and permit recognition. The mechanisms of recognition 
operate with a certain tolerance for and awareness of 
contra-indication. The four attributes are "rather necessary" 
in the sense that contra-indication of any one of them 
degrades resemblance (and presumably recognition) much 
more than simple absence, and contra-indication of many of 
them destroys resemblance and recognition. 
The tracings that yielded conclusions about "rather 
necessary" conditions also point to a definitely unnecessary 
condition: the exact shape of the caricature. The tracing 
process inevitably introduces minor metric deviations from 
the proportions of the original caricature. But the traced 
caricature remains recognizable, as Figure 11 a illustrates. Yet 
such minor distortion can be significant; the effect on 
photographs is quite different. Figure 12 displays tracings of 
~~ L*, "'''"· 'It ~~·~ 
:"\ 4 
c 
Figure 7 7 
- Caricature 8a with modified features 
f 
photographs 9c and 9d. The resemblance to the President is 
slight indeed. Two more considerations complete the point: 
tracings of large photographs are readily recognizable, and 
even a freehand copy of a caricature is generally quite 
recognizable. Then as far as recognition is concerned, the 
caricature is much less sensitive to minor random metric 
distortion than the true photograph or presumably the true 
face. Exact metric proportion is not a critical aspect of a 
caricature. 
This finding should not be surprising. Exaggeration is the 
central technical device of caricature. The caricaturist pushes 
the distinguishing trends of a subject's proportions toward 
extremes. If recognition depends on or is enhanced by these 
overstated trends, then minor metric variations should not 
alter the overstatement nor therefore reduce recognition. 
Figure 7 2 
- Tracings of Figures 9c and 9d 
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THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY 
The exploration of necessary conditions leaves unsettled 
the matter of sufficient conditions. Are the four attributes 
stressed above sufficient for a caricature to be recognizable as 
the President? The point of course would be to list attributes 
at once necessary and sufficient. For sufficiency alone, all 
one need do is select a recognizable carica ture and to 
announce that duplicates of this are sufficient. This tells us 
nothing. Strictly speaking, the bid for both necessity and 
sufficiency is already lost, since the attributes under discus-
sion are only "rather necessary" in t he e laborate se nse 
discussed earlier. However, perh aps at least there is a concept 
of "rather sufficient" to match. 
But the game really is lost. Neither the four key 
properties, no r these together with various ancillary features 
mentioned earlier, are sufficient or even approach suf-
ficiency. A convincing demonstration of this is an effort to 
caricature according to the recipe of these properties. Failure 
is remarkably easy. In the course of this study, I have learned 
to make recognizable caricatures of Nixon with fair reli-
ability (Figure 13) but also have learned how easy it is to 
miss. Figure 14 exhibits a deliberate miss. The evidence is 
there: jowls, hairline, nose, box chin, and more. But the 
visage remains unrecognizable. In this case, reasons are not at 
all elusive. The line of the profile is too concave and the 
entire head too squat. Thus there are properties "rather 
necessary" to a caricature of the President not among those 
already discussed. 
Such failures are not the exclusive province of the 
amateur. There are a number of quite inadequate profession-
al attempts. This emerged in a striking way after much of the 
analysis reported here had been completed. Searches through 
periodicals uncovered caricatures which formerly would not 
have been collected. A deliberate check of their features 
revealed that they were efforts at caricaturing the President, 
efforts which had formerly prompted no recognition. A 
careful look at the context (captions, White House in the 
background, etc.) confirmed these judgments. This remark-
able circumstance demonstrates once again that the four 
attributes fall well short of sufficiency. On the positive side, 
it stresses again how persistent these attributes are, occurring 
as they do in both successful and unsuccessful professional 
efforts. 
Why do these properties fall so far short of sufficiency, 
and what chances are there for improvement? An examina-
tion of less effective caricatures reveals on the one hand 
definite directions for refinement, and on the other some 
extreme difficulties. First, the descriptive predicates used are 
after all rather vague; they allow too much room for 
variation. For example, jowls which descend too far but 
bulge · little seem to detract. One course therefore is to 
narrow definitions of the present properties. Second, there 
are further "rather necessary" conditions inviting specifica-
tion, as illustrated above. Some caricatures suffer from a 
head too squat, or a profile too concave or convex. In 
general, it is often easy to point to a particular aspect of an 
inadequate caricature and suggest a specific improvement. A 
tracing of the caricature, with the aspect then appropriately 
modified, is more effective. But just as often the failing is an 
enigma. No approaches for improvement occur, or those that 
do are ineffective when tried. 
A more subtle barrier to refining this approach is that the 
shape predicates used here are framed in words. Words are 
singularly inadequate for conveying shape information. One 
would prefer some sort of notation for shape, a notation in 
terms of which such conditions as "long nose" or "jowls" 
could be defined in a narrower and more precise sense. But 
Goodman (1968) gives reason to doubt that such a notation 
is possible. His analysis stresses that the infinitesimal varia-
tion possible in pictures is incompatible with certain formal 
requirements for a notation. Perhaps for this purpose, 
something short of a notation in his sense would do. 
Certainly, a truly elegant theory of caricature recognition (or 
) 
') 
Figure 7 3 - Caricatures by the author 
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Figure 74 -A deliberate miss 
of recognition in general) would seem to require some 
language more appropriate than English. 
Although the properties discussed offer no certain 
formula for recognizable caricatures, most professional cari-
caturists are persistently successful in their renderings of the 
President. Each artist has developed his own recipe, his own 
"sufficient" but not "necessary" approach to caricaturing 
the President. There is a great variation from artist to artist, 
but the cartoons by the same artist are very much alike; 
Figure 15 illustrates. It is not difficult to learn to draw 
caricatures of the President in the manner of the various 
artists discussed here. Much harder, even with the help of a 
list of important properties, is to invent a suitable technique 
of one's own. 
In the light of these remarks, the relevance of the four 
properties to learning to caricature might be questioned. But 
recall that these properties were found to be ''rather 
necessary"; omitting them assures failure. Neither do begin-
ners usually include them from the first. In a casual 
experiment, about ten college students were invited to 
caricature the President from photographs 9c and 9d . They 
then heard a lecture and saw illustrations explaining many of 
the points presented here. Finally, they were again called 
upon to try a caricature, and were urged to use the several 
properties that had been stressed in the course of the lecture. 
The result was not, of course, a set of perfect caricatures. But 
in almost every case the student included in the second 
important properties he had formerly omitted. Almost all 
initial efforts were quite unrecognizable, but in several cases 
the second attempt began to bear distinct resemblance to the 
President. Figures 16 (before and after) offer an example. 
A MODEL OF RECOGNITION 
The study of caricatures of the President suggests a 
number of generalizations. The recognition of a caricature as 
representing a particular subject appears to depend in large 
part upon a few ' ' key" properties of the subject's physiog-
nomy, properties presented in exaggerated form in the 
caricature. Recognition as that subject is blocked if a few of 
these key properties are contra-indicated. Some properties 
weigh more heavily than others in this respect. If not so 
Figure 75a 
Figure 7 5c 
Figure 7 5e 
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-by Zsep 
Figure 7 5b - by Zsep 
-by Zsep 
Figure 7 5d - by Oliphant 
- by Oliphant 
Figure 7 6 -Caricatures by a student, before (left) and 
after (right) a lecture on caricatures of the President 
blocked, recognition can often take place in spite of the 
pictured spatial form's divergence from the shape of the 
subject's face, in spite of the omission of numerous details, in 
spite of the inclusion of false detail, in spite of concealment 
of several key properties (as opposed to contra-indication of 
themL and in spite of the inclusion of properties inconsistent 
with the viewpoint. 
These considerations are reminiscent of identifying an 
item through a logical conjunction of conditions. Several 
positive findings may suffice to discriminate that item from 
other items. But one negative finding suffices to disprove 
that identification. The same logic appears to underlie the 
caricature recognition process, a process however which is 
cautious enough of circumstantial evidence or counter-
evidence not to reject an hypothesis on the basis of just one 
negative finding. 
Figure 7 7 -The effect of blurring on 
recognition; pictures blurred as on the 
right were recognized 85% of the time 
~~,l 
(~ 
} 
This leaves two questions: whether the same general 
model of pattern recognition applies to face, as well 
as to caricature, identification; and further whether the 
properties caricature and face recognition depend upon 
are the same. Most broadly, face recognition like cari-
cature recognition can be viewed as a process of checking 
for certain "key" attributes. To put flesh on that skeleton 
requires saying something about what kind of attributes. The 
situation with caricature suggests that in normal face 
recognition also: (1) precise metric information and fine 
detail about the face is irrelevant; (2) the key attributes are 
relatively few; (3) the disposition of non-key attributes, 
whether presented, concealed, or contra-indicated, is ir-
relevant to recognition; (4) recognition may take place on 
the basis of very partial evidence; (5) recognition will be 
blocked by contra-indication of key attributes. 
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Metric Precision and Fine Detail 
Recent experiments of Harmon {1973) establish clearly 
that metric precision and fine detail are unnecessary for face 
recognition. Harmon tested subjects' recognition of images of 
faces treated in ways that destroyed fine detail and exact 
contour to varying degrees. He found that recognition could 
survive substantial mistreatment of the image, as in Figure 
17 for instance. 
Superficially, this finding appears contrary to the dis-
covery mentioned earlier that tracings of small photographs 
of the President did not yield good resemblances. The 
resolution lies in recognizing two points. First of all, the 
amount of blurring a given face can stand and still remain 
recognizable will certainly vary with the particular attributes 
that are distinctive of that face, as Harmon has noted. But 
second and more important, this paper argues that recogni-
tion of real faces, like caricatures, depends on the trend, 
rather than the exact measure, of features- whether noses are 
long or short as noses go, chins are weak or strong as chins 
go. On this interpretation, for face and caricature recognition 
alike, accuracy per se would have no value; but inaccuracy to 
the degree of changing trends would block recognition. 
Indeed the traced features of the President in Figure 12 do 
not deliver particularly well three of the four properties 
isolated: jowls, box chin, and elongated nose. 
Few Key Attributes 
This issue presupposes that recogn1t1on depends on 
various measures, accurate or crude, of the face, measures 
such as nose length, nose angle, eye placement, eyebrow 
thickness. Obviously one could list an enormous number of 
dimensions which varied across individuals and logically 
could be used to differentiate them. But the analysis of 
caricatures suggests that, there at least, relatively few dimen-
sions suffice. The four attributes identified earlier might 
break down into ten or so dimensions- the nose might 
involve length, thickness, and upward curl, for instance. 
Although the attributes proved insufficient for recognition, 
their obviously important role suggests they reflect ten or so 
out of 20 or 30 crucial dimensions, not ten buried among 
100. Does the same principle apply to recognition of real 
faces; are key dimensions for a particular face relatively few 
in number, say 20 or 30? 
The question has not been directly studied, but indirect 
evidence suggests an affirmative answer. Harmon {1973) in 
another study found that 21 dimensions sufficed to sort very 
effectively a population of 256 portraits of white unbearded 
males without glasses from 20 to 50 years old. Some 
examples of the dimensions are hair from full to bald, 
forehead receding- vertical - bulging, nose short-medium-
long. Indeed subjects' estimates of the ten measures most 
prominent or differentiating for a particular photograph 
served quite reliably to single it out from the population, 
despite the contamination of frequent errors in estimating. 
Without speaking directly to the process of reflexive recogni-
tion of individuals, the findings demonstrate that relatively 
few attributes suffice to single an individual out of a large 
population, and also that such attributes can be perceptually 
judged. 
Irrelevant Attributes 
This category asks whether in recognition of true faces as 
in caricature recognition, large numbers of non-key attributes 
are simply irrelevant to recognition, which will succeed 
whether those attributes are represented or misrepresented. I 
know of no literature addressing this issue. If one accepts the 
thesis that caricature recognition simply borrows the normal 
face recognition process, caricature itself is the best example 
of this happening. 
Partial Evidence 
A study by Goldstein and Mackenberg {1966) established 
that normal face recognition can succeed on the basis of 
partial evidence. Goldstein and Mackenberg employed a 
variety of masks obscuring parts of the face and studied face 
recognition in kindergarten, first, and fifth grade children. 
The task was to recognize masked photographs of classmates, 
photographs which, unmasked, were all recognized two 
weeks prior to testing. Exposure from the middle of the nose 
up permitted 95% recognition by the fifth graders. Even 
exposure from the eyebrows up allowed fifth graders to 
recognize 70% of the photographs. The stress laid earlier on 
the hair and the hairline as a cue for recognition receives 
some support here. Exposure below the center of the nose 
yielded only about 45% recognition, as did exposure of a 
horizontal bar-shaped region including the eyes and the 
bridge of the nose. In summary, it would appear that the face 
from the eyebrows up offers a great deal of information for 
recognition; both the muzzle area and the face from the 
eyebrows to the bridge of nose offer markedly less informa-
tion and about the same amount, in isolation. Recognition 
evidence from the nose is difficult to assess here, as almost all 
the masks partly obscured it. 
Counter-Evidence 
Some encouragement for the role of counter-evidence in 
perception of faces comes from a study by Bradshaw and 
Wallace {1971). They utilized stimulus materials assembled 
with an lndentikit-a collection of transparent overlays 
providing a variety of noses, eyes, and other facial features 
for the compilation of complete faces; the kit is normally 
used in criminal identification work. Subjects were presented 
with pairs of faces, the two of each pair sometimes being 
identical, or sometimes differing by varying numbers of 
features. Subjects were to report as quickly as possible 
whether the faces were identical or not. Bradshaw and 
Wallace found that responses were more rapid the greater the 
number of differing features. This supports a serial feature-
checking analysis of the matching task at the expense of a 
parallel "gestalt" analysis, where processing time would not 
decrease with an increase in differing features. In particular, 
the data best fit the hypothesis that the process was 
"sequential, self-terminating, without replacement"-
meaning that the process was one of sequentially testing for 
matching features, that it terminated upon finding a dis-
crepancy, and that features once tested were never tested 
again for that example. 
These results are compatible with the view of face 
recognition proposed here; the serial finding underscores the 
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importance of individual attributes and the self-termination 
is equivalent to the heavy weight accorded counter-evidence. 
However, this matching task involved pairs of strange faces 
whereas the paradigm task of the present study is the 
recognition of extremely familiar faces. Bradshaw and 
Wallace recognize this difference themselves. Their study, 
nevertheless, demonstrates that the human pe rceptual system 
is highly sensitive to, and accords considerable weight to, 
mismatches in comparing faces. This sensitivity and weight 
plausibly carries over to face recognition, where the stimulus 
must in some sense be compared to stored information about 
familiar faces. 
A GESTALT ALTERNATIVE? 
T he argument for an attribute-checking model of face 
recognition seems to stand in opposition to a gestalt view of 
recognition, where the perceptual mechanisms respond not 
to a collection of attributes, but to the holistic pattern of 
their interrelations. In fact, the two perspectives do not 
compete nearly as much as they seem to. A little thought 
reveals that the attribute-checking model allows perfectly 
well for a gestalt interpretation. 
First of all, no specific restrictions have been placed on 
what may count as a key attribute. True, the four properties 
stressed in the example, jowls, nose, hairline, and box chin, 
are spatially localized in certain parts of the head and might 
be called individual features. But this accident of the present 
analysis does not disallow properties with ~ mQ_re gestalt 
flavor, properties such as the ratios of distances between the 
eyes and from eye to mouth, or approximate positions of 
features in the oval of the head, or the general shape of the 
head dimensionalized in some manner. Indeed, the contour 
of the whole seemed to be part of the problem with the 
"deliberate miss" in Figure 14. 
On this interpretation, the attributes, however gestalt-like, 
still describe the physical shape of the face. But perhaps faces 
might be encoded in memory and recognized in holistic 
terms not directly descriptive of shape, in terms of person-
ality for instance. One person might have a spiteful but lazy 
face, another a visage cloyingly .friendly, and so forth. That 
faces can be encoded reliably in such terms has been 
demonstrated (Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955; 
Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973). Observers are generally 
asked to classify the faces presented in terms of a given 
vocabulary or along dimensions such as sincere-insincere. The 
classifications are often "objective" within the culture, that 
is, much the same from judge to judge. However, there is no 
evidence of correlation between attributed personality and a 
depicted person's actual personality (Hochberg 
1964:105-11 0). 
Such a means of encoding faces may not be especially 
effective. Yin (1970), in a study where observers tried to 
describe faces in writing and later match faces to. descrip-
tions, found that description of personality did not work 
well. In any case, far from being contrary to an attribute 
checking process, readings of personality appear to depend 
on just the sorts of facial attributes under discussion. For 
example, Secord and Muthard, in a study of judgments of 
women's faces, found a frequent clustering of three person-
ality attributions, "conceited," "likes men's attention," and 
"demanding," which they termed the "gold-digger syn-
drome." The making of these judgments proved to be highly 
correlated positively with a photograph displaying high 
eyebrows, bowed lips, visible eyelids, tilted head, and narrow 
eyes, and correlated negatively with square face, widened 
eyes, untilted head, and straight lips. 
A more serious challenge comes from E. H. Gombrich 
(1972:26-28) who points out that the particular measures a 
face appears to have depend on the whole shape of the face. 
For instance, how close together the eyes seem-and there-
fore how lively or dull the face appears-turns not only on 
their objective distance but on how widely the whole face 
and hair extends. This stance really presents a synthesis of 
the gestalt and attribute-detecting spirits. Acknowledging the 
relevance of measures of the face, Gombrich's account points 
out that such measures are influenced by the shape of the 
whole. Such an interpretation sits comfortably with the 
attribute-checking process explained here because that 
attribute-checking is done by the human eye. Recognition 
research depending on objective measures of human features 
would not allow for the gestalt influence. But in research 
such as Harmon's or Secord's, or for instance in the use of an 
ldentikit, the human eye judges the relevant dimensions and 
gestalt influences come into play automatically. 
In summary, no genuine conflict obtains between the 
gestalt viewpoint and the present description of recognition 
as a process of checking certain physical attributes of the 
face. Indeed, the gestalt perspective enriches the concept of 
how such attributes checking works. This is not to say that 
differences never emerge between attribute-checking and 
gestalt theories of recognition, but at least such differences 
make little trouble for the present argument. 
RESEMBLANCE AND RECOGNITION 
The available evidence encourages the position that face 
and caricature recognition are similar processes, depending 
on the presence of some among a few key attributes, and on 
the absence of contra-indications of key attributes. The 
natural step is to conclude that face recognition employs just 
those same properties that the caricaturist chooses to 
emphasize; he selects these in order to borrow the normal 
recognition process. 
An alternative interpretation is that caricatures are con-
ventionalized symbols established by the practice of cari-
caturists within the culture. Indeed, this occasionally 
happens. Gombrich (1972: 12-13) has cited a case where 
Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's financial wizard, gradually became 
represented solely by a high stiff collar. In general, though, a 
convention for every person does not allow for recognition 
in-caricature of individuals one has never before seen 
caricatured, a common event. 
A weaker but more plausible version of the convention 
theory is that observers have learned - at -a reflexive auto-
matic level-what information caricatures generally provide 
and what they leave out. Normal face recognition would use 
many more properties than caricatures are careful about. For 
a naive viewer, those "extra" properties not captured in 
caricatures would act as counter-evidence, blocking recogni-
tion. This suggests an experiment. Would naive viewers, 
familiar with picturing in general but unfamiliar with 
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caricatures, fail or succeed in identifying familiar faces from 
caricatures? Such an experiment has not been done. Even so, 
my bet is that extended adaptation would not be required. 
Economy of means in psychological functioning argues that 
the extra information provided by accurate depictions over 
caricatures is simply extraneous to the recognition process. 
The trouble with this tack is that it seems to imply a 
discrete, categorical perception of the world. Can it be true 
that out of the richness of visual information offered the eye 
we draw only a few trends- long noses versus short, weak 
chins versus strong. Do we see simply by pigeon-holing? 
Surely any such stand contradicts our everyday experience 
with the fineness and subtlety of visual discrimination. 
Indeed, we know a good deal more about a face than a 
caricature would offer. For one thing, we do not mistake 
caricatures for accurate conventional portraits; we can 
readily point out the exaggerations. Even given a convention-
al portrait, if we are asked (without the model present) 
"what do you think of this resemblance," we can sometimes 
point out subtle divergences- the hair too curly, the forehead 
a little high, and so forth. From this standpoint, a trend-
oriented categorical recognition process seems implausible. 
The solution lies in realizing that recognition is one thing 
and resemblance something else again. Nuances of resem-
blance are at issue when one already knows the identity of 
the depicted face, by being told or by recognizing it. 
Recognition involves a rapid reflexive "look-up" system for 
identifying faces. Streamlined for function, the system 
operates with relatively few categorizations which taken 
together differentiate one person from another quickly and 
effectively, and without requiring extremely precise scanning 
of the stimulus. When recognition is achieved, one may then 
find one has available considerable further information about 
the face, even information contrary to the stimulus. 
Accordingly, we may reflexively recognize a caricature of 
the President with straight hair, no bags under the eyes, and 
curved eyebrows, even though we know his hair curls a 
bit, his eyebrows peak, and his eyes have bags. This is part of 
our knowledge, but not part of that knowledge used by the 
look-up system. Likewise, we may discover an old friend on 
the street, only to realize on second glance that it is someone 
else; the results of the reflexive look-up are checked against 
the further knowledge made available by the look-up. 
In this context, the paradox of caricature recognition 
disappears. Though relative to our full perceptual capacities, 
caricatures are grossly inaccurate in depicting the shapes of 
their subjects, the look-up subsystem exercises much more 
generous standards. The caricaturist chooses his exaggeration 
not to achieve a convincing resemblance, but to trigger the 
look-up system, perhaps to trigger it even more effectively 
than the real face. He has the freedom to do this, and to 
pursue aims such as humor and interpretation of the 
personality at the same time, exactly because there is so little 
the look-up system really cares about. 
On August 24 Associate Editor Larry Gross brought the following 
news story from the Philadelphia Bulletin (8/23/74) to my attention. 
Because of its obvious relation to the preceding paper on caricature, 
I am taking the liberty of adding it as an extra illustration to the paper 
by Perkins. - SW 
PRESIDOOGERALDR.FORD 
Ford Gives Nightmares 
To Political CartC)onists" 
_,. fl'he writer is .a political car• 
toonist for the Springfield 
'(Mass.) Daily News. 
By JAMES TRELEASE 
Newhouse News Service 
Springfield, Mass. - Politi-
cal cartoonists are going to . 
have trouble with President -
Ford. 
There may be something he. 
as President can do to curb 
inflation, but there is :noth-
. ing he can do to curb the cax\. 
·: Jtootlists~ growing wra~ -
; short of bavmg hiS lace alter• 
ere(L. . 
He is what we call a ~•no­
body.,- ThM, ds, there. is noth- . 
ing distinguishing about his 
face. If he robbed a bank 
the teller would be hard- -
pressed to come up with a de-
scription. Outstanding ears? 
Nose? Hair? Clothes? Noth-
ing! 
A 'Nightmare' 
By comparison with our 
three previous Presidents, Mr. 
_ Ford ds a cartoonist's night· 
· mare. It only he had ~FK's 
hair and plnstripe $Ults; ~ohn~ 
~ son's ~ and cow.boy, boots,. 
Mr. Nixon's nose and s-agging 
jowls. 
For the next six months, the 
President's every move will 
be closely studied by the So--
viets, General Motors, the 
J\FL-CIO, congressmen, · gov .. 
ernors and .mayors. 
But the most detailed s:cru~ 
\ tiny will be by the nation's 
cartoonists, in -seatch of a 
prop - ~ Truman horrihurg, 
an FDR cigarette holder, an 
LBJ beagle, a JFK cowlick, 
-a squint, a soowl- 'anything. 
- Fast Aging 
There are those-who con• 
tend . that _th~ pi'esfdenc~ _is 
sucli' a burden th~t a Pres!~ -~ 
dent ages five times kstet. ~ 
in the Oval· OffiCe.. . But the ~ 
fastest agmg is Imposed. b~ , 
:the nation's cartoonists, add'C!' 
ing a wrinkle here. a crow's, 
foot there, bending a shoulder 
and .fowling a chin-all in 
search of a caricature. · 
My guess is that Mr. Ford's · 
. balding for'ehead will loom 
larger and larger, his eye& 
will grow baggier, the nose . 
shorter and · the upper · Hp 
longer and longer. -
His smiling face already; 
has proved to lbe more . ~.cog .. i 
nizable ithan his· serloua · ex• : 
. pressl~ n may; In fact, be- ; 
-~ come his broad toothy trade- · 
mark. But not until we car .. 
toonists ·do a [ot of work at 
our work. 
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NOTE 
1This research was conducted at Project Zero, of the Harvard 
Graduate School of Education, operating under National Science 
Foundation Grant GB-31064 and National Institute of Education 
Grant G-003-0169. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily 
reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education, 
and no official endorsement should be inferred. 
I thank Howard Gardner and Nelson Goodman for their perceptive 
comments on an earlier version; Paul Szep, political cartoonist for the 
Boston Globe , for an enlightening interview on the ins and outs of his 
art; Graham Roupas for several useful conversations; and John 
Kennedy, who first drew my attention to the problems of caricature. 
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